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Introduction
What is a ‘Law and Society’ Perspective on Intellectual Property?
‘Intellectual Property’ is a rather awkward term that denotes several distinct bodies of law,
including the law of patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets and so-called rights of
publicity. These laws protect diverse types of intangible products of the human intellect,
such as biotechnology inventions, digitalized music, consumer product brand names and
industrial know-how – hence the term ‘intellectual’. They provide ‘property-like’ protection
for such intangibles by granting the owner of intellectual property rights the ability to exclude
others from using their intellectual property, at least to a certain extent and, usually, for a
limited period of time (Hetcher, 2002). Until fairly recently, intellectual property law was
a relatively obscure legal speciality, and one that was subject to little scholarly (much less
public) attention. With the rise of the global economy and the prominence of post-industrial
information-based industries over the past several decades, however, intellectual property law
and related policy issues has become the subject of everyday culture. Indeed, it is hard to read
a daily newspaper without encountering references to patent, copyright, or trademark disputes.
Intellectual property is also increasingly the subject of attention in the popular press (see, for
example, Bollier, 2002, 2005; Klein, 2000; McLeod, 2001, 2005, 2007). Perhaps most telling,
contemporary intellectual property law topics are also the subject of mainstream popular
culture, such as cartoons. Intellectual property law and related issues thus permeate many
areas of everyday life, just like other areas of law long-studied by law and society scholars.
Yet, somewhat surprisingly, even though intellectual property is a subject that has attracted
an increasing amount of scholarly attention worldwide, relatively little of this academic work
focuses on themes or approaches that are at the core of ‘law and society’ scholarship. To be
sure, it is problematic to identify a clear or single ‘core’ or ‘canon’ of law and society research
(Friedman, 2005, 1986; Sarat, 2004; Seron and Silbey, 2004). Traditionally, however, law and
society scholarship has focused on social scientific empirical studies of law in action, including
studying the actors, institutions and processes of the law. More recently, law and society
scholarship has also encompassed humanities-based approaches to understanding the cultural
life of law, everyday legal experiences and law’s socially constitutive nature (Friedman, 2005;
Sarat and Simon, 2003; Seron and Silbey, 2004). One common assumption in all of these
approaches is that law must be understood in its social, cultural and historical context.
Yet most scholarship on intellectual property law continues to be doctrinal or abstractly
philosophical, which is the dominant approach to the study of law in most American law
See, for example, Hilary B. Price’s syndicated newspaper comic ‘Rymes With Orange’, dated
1/23/00: http://www.rymeswithorange.com/home.php?date=20000123. This single-panel comic is
entitled ‘The New Agenda’. It depicts an elementary school teacher with her children sitting around
her on the floor. The teacher explains ‘Class, today’s lesson on sharing has been cancelled. It will be
replaced by a lesson called “protecting intellectual property”’. The comic is funny and revealing about
popular culture’s understanding of intellectual property.
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schools (Coombe, 2004). This focus on legal doctrine and abstract theory is changing,
however, as scholars from a variety of disciplines – such as sociology, political science,
anthropology and cultural studies as well as law, – have begun to explore intellectual property
law from different perspectives. The essays in this volume draw on and develop this emerging
law and society approach to the study of intellectual property, whether or not the author of
any particular essay self-identifies as a ‘law and society’ scholar. The essays as a whole have
a creatively eclectic approach to the study of intellectual property. They focus on different
types of intellectual property, including patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret and right of
publicity laws. They employ diverse methodologies. Many of the essays also explore law’s
relationship to society and the social institutions and cultures of which it is a part. Importantly,
the essays in this volume examine different aspects of intellectual property in several different
countries and include a significant focus on the increasingly important global politics of
intellectual property worldwide.
I

Social and Cultural Histories of Intellectual Property

Historical perspectives on law and a focus on the cultural life of law are at the core of the law
and society tradition (Seron and Silbey, 2004). The essays in Part I of this volume focus on
different types of intellectual property and focus on different historical periods to examine their
particular research questions. Yet these essays share some common approaches and themes,
including an appreciation for the historical and cultural dimensions of intellectual property.
This perspective highlights that intellectual property is a relatively recent development in
Western history. Intellectual property doctrines that create private ownership rights in intangible
creations, inventions and information (as well as the social practices and institutions relating to
them) are historically contingent and socially contested rather than natural or inevitable (May
and Sell, 2006). As the essays in this section show, intellectual property creates boundaries
of private ownership that are in tension with principles of public access; these tensions and
boundaries are developed and contested in different ways over time.
Martha Woodmansee’s essay (Chapter 1) is an influential and seminal study of the social
construction of an ideology of ‘authorship’ in eighteenth-century Germany. Her work is
part of a large and interdisciplinary body of scholarship, influenced by Foucault and often
grounded in literary theory and cultural studies, that explores how, why and to what effect
the modern Western notion of authorship arose (see, for example, Boyle, 1996; Jaszi, 1991;
Rose, 1995; Woodmansee and Jaszi, 1994). Woodmansee examines the social and cultural
conditions that gave rise to a particular, Romantic, ideology of the author in eighteenth-century
Germany. Focusing on an interpretation of published debates during this period, involving
writers, literary theorists, publishers and others, Woodmansee shows how eighteenth-century
Germany saw the rise of a new concept and social practice of authorship. Renaissance
Indeed, there is an important and large body of literature outside of the law and society tradition
that focuses on justifying intellectual property from primarily philosophical or economic perspectives.
(See, for example, Drahos, 1996; Fisher, 2001; Hughes, 1988; Landes and Posner, 2003; Shiffrin,
2001.)

Woodmansee cites Foucault’s essay, ‘What Is an Author?’, in Harari (1979), as framing the
issues examined in her essay for this volume.
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notions focused on the writer’s status as craftsman, of largely equal status to other craftsmen
responsible for creating books, such as the bookbinder or publisher. The writer was viewed
as a scribe or ‘vehicle’ who wrote primarily with input from external sources of inspiration.
In sharp contrast, Romantic notions of authorship that arose during the eighteenth century
came to view the writer as a creative ‘genius’ whose inspiration derived solely from within.
As Woodmansee shows, this transformation of notions of authorship took place in a specific
social, economic and aesthetic context, as writers consciously and publicly advocated for a
model of authorship that would provide a justification for granting them property rights in the
products of their creative efforts. The changing notion of authorship was an important link in
justifying the rise of copyright law as a legal means to create a property interest in writings
– one that vested in the first instance in authors.
One key insight that this body of work develops is that modern notions of authorship that
underlie copyright law in particular are historically contingent and specific constructs that are
mutually constitutive with other arenas of social and cultural discourse (Jaszi, 1991). Some
of this scholarship also attempts to delineate the ways in which modern intellectual property
law (primarily copyright law) has been influenced and, at times, constrained by the ideology
of the individual author (Boyle, 1996; Jaszi, 1991). In particular, copyright law privileges
the author as an individual creative genius by requiring ‘originality’ as a necessary basis for
protection. One result of this privileging of the individual creative genius in copyright law
is that it ignores the social fact that much creative work is the product of collective rather
than individual creativity (Arewa, 2006; Demers, 2006; Jaszi, 1991; Seeger 2004; Sherman,
1995). All sorts of creative work, from music to painting to storytelling, are collaborative and
cumulative rather than stemming from the mind of a single creative genius creating wholly
from nothing.
While the work of Woodmansee and others has been influential to intellectual property
scholarship, critics of the Romantic author scholarship have pointed out that it is often difficult
to discern the sometimes ambiguous or contradictory relationship between the ‘genius-author’
construct and any particular strand of copyright law doctrine over time (Lemley, 1997). Bracha
(2004) has a related criticism in a suggestive article examining the transformation of patent
law from a system of royal ‘privileges’ in the seventeenth century to a system of ‘rights’ by
the early nineteenth century. As Bracha correctly points out, it is a challenge to the historian
of intellectual property law to speak broadly about ‘intellectual property’ since intellectual
property law doctrines – such as the patent law he discusses – may mean very different things
in different historical periods. His article demonstrates that early Western patent systems have
a very different ideological, institutional and economic context that makes comparison of the
logics of early patent law and policy to modern patent law issues problematic.
The question Woodmansee explores historically – who is an ‘author’ – has a parallel in
patent law: who counts as an ‘inventor’. Intellectual property scholars have yet to fully study
this question historically, although it is clear that a related notion of ‘inventive genius’ arose
in patent law (albeit at a later period) and likewise influenced both legal doctrine and social
practices (Bracha, 2005, chapter 5; Fisk, 1998).
One of the most contentious issues in contemporary intellectual property law is the political
economy of intellectual property rights. Nations with highly developed IP-based industries,
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such as the USA, promote strong intellectual property law systems worldwide and pressure
countries with weaker intellectual property law protection by a variety of means, including
international trade agreements (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002; May and Sell, 2006; Sell, 2003).
Historian Doron Ben-Atar’s essay (Chapter 2) provides an interesting historical perspective
on contemporary debates over the politics of industrial policy in early US history. Ben-Atar
examines and interprets Treasury secretary Alexander Hamilton’s views in the early 1790s on
the political economy of international economic competition. Ben-Atar focuses on the ‘Report
on Manufactures’ (ROM) that Hamilton submitted to Congress which set forth what Ben-Atar
describes as very bold and aggressive views for the creation of economic prosperity in the
new, post-colonial US society. For Hamilton, and others, the key to economic prosperity lay
in self-sufficiency, particularly in technologies of manufacture – which were almost entirely
lacking in the new nation. The ROM, Ben-Atar argues, advocated such measures to encourage
emigration from Europe of skilled artisans, craftsmen and managers who would bring their
industrial and technological know-how with them, and even encouraging the smuggling
of modern machinery out of Europe to the USA by offering financial incentives. Although
the policies Hamilton advocated risked creating further enmity with England, in particular,
he strongly believed that the need for technological self-sufficiency overrode any potential
political dangers. Interestingly, Ben-Atar argues that Hamilton also took a very partisan view
of the need to protect US technology and innovation, advocating for strong protection against
transmission out of the USA of American-owned technology and know-how whilst at the
same time advising Congress to adopt policies sanctioning ‘piracy’ of similar information
from Europe. Ultimately, Ben-Atar reveals that Hamilton’s proposed industrial policies were
not adopted, but were largely rendered unnecessary in the light of continued immigration into
the USA by many of the skilled workers whom Hamilton’s proposals targeted.
The main theme of Ben-Atar’s essay, which he also advances in a recent book (2004), is that the USA
in its earliest years as a new nation was an active appropriator of industrialized Europe’s technological
know-how, which was used to develop a thriving indigenous manufacturing capability. This is
especially ironic in the light of contemporary international debates over intellectual property where
the USA, now an intellectual property exporter, advocates for strong international property protection
worldwide.

Many recurring issues relating to intellectual property occur in the workplace. Perhaps this
is not surprising since many workers in post-industrial societies are employed as knowledge
workers whose creative and inventive products may be protected as intellectual property.
Among the most important and potentially vexing issues in this context is who actually owns
intellectual property that is either produced by employees or acquired by them in the course of
For example, computer software and hardware, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, and
entertainment industries (movies, music) are all powerful users of intellectual property systems.

For other useful histories of intellectual property during this period, see Ben-Atar (2004);
Bowrey (1997); Bracha (2005); Deazley (2004); Khan (2005); and MacLeod (1988).

This aspect of Ben-Atar’s arguments has been criticized by intellectual property historians.
Fisk, for example, stresses that the term ‘pirate’ cannot meaningfully capture the actions that BenAtar describes, since in the late eighteenth century, there was no clear law of ‘trade secrets’ that might
protect industrial know-how, nor was there any international law that prohibited the use of technological
information or patented inventions in another country (Fisk, 2005).
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their jobs. To contemporary minds, the notion that an employer (often a corporation) owns or
controls various types of intellectual property of its employees seems unremarkable. Yet, in a
series of creative and insightful articles, legal historian Catherine Fisk shows how this modern
legal reality is a relatively recent – and contested – development. Her work explores the rapid
and sometimes torturous transformation of legal doctrines that came to privilege employer
ownership of intellectual property.
Fisk’s essay (Chapter 3) focuses on issues of ownership and control of intellectual property
in the context of the employment relationship – not on who is an author under an IP regime, as
developed in Woodmansee’s work, but who owns the products of authorship and inventorship
under IP law doctrines. This contribution is part of a larger body of scholarship in which Fisk
explores these issues as they have played out in different arenas of intellectual property law
between the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Fisk, 1998, 2003). Focusing primarily
on a creative analysis of US published legal decisions, and with a deep understanding of the
social, cultural and historical context of these decisions, Fisk’s work challenges some of the
taken-for-grantedness of contemporary understandings of IP law. In particular, Fisk examines
the relatively rapid shift between the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of several
intellectual property law doctrines that privileged employees at the beginning of this period but
benefited employers at the end. Fisk’s work carefully delineates this dramatic transformation
(both in doctrine and in ideology) and convincingly explains why it took place.
Fisk’s work on copyright law (Fisk, 2003) shows that throughout much of the nineteenth
century, copyright law privileged employee authors who created copyrighted works. Examining
all reported judicial decisions in the USA before 1910 that involved an employee author
contesting ownership of the authored work, Fisk concludes that, until the early twentieth
century, ‘virtually every court’ dealing with the issue held as a ‘default rule’ that employeecreated copyrighted works were owned by the employee as a matter of copyright doctrine,
even if these works were created in the course of employment. This is striking, Fisk notes,
because nineteenth-century courts in non-intellectual property law cases were not particularly
solicitous of employee rights; the modern default rule that arose in court decisions in the late
nineteenth century and was codified in the 1909 Copyright Act (in the so-called ‘work for hire’
doctrine) is exactly the opposite: it generally recognizes the legal fiction that the employer is
the ‘author’ of works produced by creative employees. Fisk’s essay skilfully interprets this
transformation in copyright law and draws out the multiple legal, social and cultural factors
that influenced it.
Fisk develops a similar theme while looking at the question of how patent law answers the
question of who owns patented invention created by an employee (Fisk, 1998). As she does in
her work on copyright, Fisk examines patent law as reflected in published US cases, understood
in historical, social and cultural context. Her work is a sophisticated and creative interpretation
of a shift in patent law understanding of employee ownership rights in their inventions. Thus,
Fisk shows that roughly between 1840 and 1880 courts routinely held that an inventor was
presumed to own his invention, regardless of his status as an employee. By the turn of the
twentieth century, however, this legal presumption changed as courts increasingly held that
the employment contract of inventorship, rather than patent law doctrines (and ideologies),
See, for example, the thorny and unresolved issues of who owns the intellectual productions of
academic employees in McSherry (2001).
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controls who owns a patented invention. As with the related copyright law example that Fisk
explores, the reasons for this transformation in patent law are complicated and often subtle.
They include changing judicial attitudes towards the creative and inventive process, the
rise of corporations and collaborative employee inventorship, and changing notions of the
employment contract.
In Chapter 3, Fisk investigates other intellectual property law doctrines: trade secret
law and restrictive covenants. She explores how the rise of trade secret law and the use
of restrictive covenants between the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries combined to
both limit employee job mobility and to support the rise of corporate control of intellectual
property. As with her work on patent law and copyright law, Fisk’s work is based on a rich
analysis of published cases (primarily from the USA) that deal with issues of ownership and
control of trade secrets as well as the appropriate uses of restrictive covenants that limit an
employee’s ability to switch jobs or to use their knowledge acquired from one employer for
the benefit of another employer. Fisk’s work is based on a case study of a corporate employer
whose archival records during this period allow Fisk to examine transformations of legal
doctrine but also to see how changes in legal doctrine actually influenced (or not) corporate
actor behaviour.
Fisk examines how at the beginning of the nineteenth century trade secret law simply did
not exist; and there were no restrictive covenants to limit employees’ ability to use knowledge
gained in the course of employment in subsequent employment. There were some restrictions
on employees’ ability to use valuable workplace information and know-how, but these were
limited and tended to stem from formal apprenticeship or fiduciary relationships – they
were not duties imposed by law. Fisk concludes: ‘There simply was no basis in the law for
most people who employed assistants to prevent them from using in a later employment the
knowledge that they acquired in an earlier employment. In other words, workplace knowledge
and skill remained, in the eyes of the law, an attribute of each worker, not an asset of a firm’
(p. 80).
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, this situation had changed quite dramatically.
Courts increasingly recognized trade secret information as an asset owned by employers, and
they increasingly imposed duties on employees not to disseminate or use workplace knowledge
in subsequent employment. As Fisk shows, at the early part of the twentieth century, courts
recognized strong and expanded categories of trade secrets, covering not simply discrete
proprietary information but also general ‘know-how’ of skilled workers. They also upheld
strong injunctions to protect this valuable information when employees took new jobs. The
route courts took was not always straightforward or clear, since courts had to balance changing
notions of freedom of contract, the imperatives of economic development and ideologies of
free labour that were all contested at this time. But the result by the early twentieth century
was the creation of doctrines to protect workplace information as an asset of employers and to
facilitate strong policies of corporate control of intellectual property generally.
Restrictive covenants are not typically viewed as a type of ‘intellectual property’ law. They are
agreements that limit an employee’s ability to compete with a former employer, and so are properly
considered to be within the law of unfair competition. Since restrictive covenants may restrict the use
or dissemination of information such as trade secrets, however, this area of law clearly overlaps with
intellectual property law.


Intellectual Property

xvii

Fisk’s work in this volume and elsewhere challenges the taken-for-grantedness of
contemporary understanding in intellectual property law by highlighting the fact that today’s
reality of corporate ownership and control of intellectual property is a fairly recent and
contested development, the consequences of which are as yet not fully understood.
Legal scholar David Wall’s essay (Chapter 4) presents a more contemporary focus on an
unusual and relatively recent type of intellectual property: so-called ‘rights of publicity’.
Rights of publicity generally provide for the protection from unauthorized use of one’s
persona – to include name, likeness, image, or, more broadly, attributes of identity. The
right of publicity is most fully developed in US law, in common law doctrines and statutes.
However, there are indications that related rights are increasingly being recognized in other
countries. Historically, the right of publicity has roots in privacy law (the personal right to
be left alone). But, as many intellectual property scholars have criticized, rights of publicity
have developed into powerful and expansive property-like rights in a commodified celebrity
persona (Coombe, 1998; Langvardt, 1997; Madow, 1993). Indeed, once the right of publicity
is understood to be property rather than merely a personal right, logically it has many of
the attributes of property, including post-mortem viability of the celebrity subject. Critical
scholars are concerned that the law’s recognition of expanded rights of publicity, with often
uncertain contours or limits, allows celebrities (who are most often the ones asserting publicity
rights) to censor unauthorized use of their personas and unduly restrict public expressive
activities (Coombe, 1998; Langvardt, 1997; Madow, 1993). This is particularly problematic
because right of publicity owners often successfully assert facially non-meritorious claims
against unauthorized use of celebrity personas because few targets of threatened legal action
are willing or able to defend themselves in light of the uncertainties and costs of intellectual
property litigation (Gallagher, 2005).
Wall’s essay examines the social construction and policing of cultural icon Elvis Presley
as ‘intellectual property’ after his death. Wall takes a classic ‘law in action’ approach to
understanding how the Elvis persona was created and recognized under right of publicity
law, thus removing the Elvis persona from the public domain. He also creatively details how
the owners of the Elvis publicity rights have policed these rights to protect against popular
culture appropriation that offers alternative meaning of the Elvis persona. In this and later
work on the same subject, Wall shows how the celebrity right of publicity is in tension, as the
culturally constructed persona must be restricted (or policed) to preserve the owner’s ability
to control the authorized meanings associated with the celebrity while at the same time it
must be circulated in popular culture to maintain the popularity that allows the rights’ owner
to exploit the economic benefits of the celebrity persona (Wall, 2003).
‘Piracy’ is a term that denotes moral deviance, and it is a term that historically has long
been linked to claims of unauthorized uses of intellectual property. Woodmansee’s essay
for this volume shows, for instance, how early debates over the development of copyright
law invoked the image of piracy at a historical point where the debate over whether the
unauthorized copying of books was an act of piracy or a public benefit was far from certain.

See, for example, California Civil Code Section 3344.1, which sets forth a statutory right of
publicity that pertains to deceased celebrities; see also Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21
P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001), which dealt with the publicity rights of long-deceased celebrities known as ‘The
Three Stooges’.
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In a very different context, Demers (2006) argues that the rhetoric of piracy-as-theft embraced
by courts in contemporary debates over the proper scope of copyright protection for various
musical works and practices threatens to blur distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate
musical practices (see also Arewa, 2006). She argues that the failure by courts in prominent
copyright infringement cases to properly distinguish between unlawful practices (such as
burning copies of a protected CD and sharing it with thousands of others over the Internet)
and lawful uses of copyrighted works created by ‘transformative appropriation’ (for example,
the borrowing from and allusion to pre-existing works that characterize certain musical
genres such as hip-hop or jazz) is facilitated by an un-nuanced notion of copyright piracy
that threatens to diminish musical creativity. In yet another context, Drahos and Braithwaite
(2002) show how the rhetoric of piracy in political discourse concerning the emergence of a
global regime of intellectual property protection is significant. Prior to emergence of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the development of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), nations had no general duty to protect or enforce
intellectual property rights within their borders. The linking of intellectual property rights
issues with trade agreements under TRIPS, however, substantially altered this arrangement
since, for the first time, countries bound by TRIPS were required to provide protection for
many types of intellectual property. The rhetoric of piracy, Drahos and Braithwaite argue, was
a significant ideological resource and tool for persuasion in changing perceptions about the
morality and urgency of establishing TRIPS, an ‘agreement that in another era would have
been rejected as a global charter for monopolists has come to be thought of as consistent with
free trade and competition’ (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002, p. 38).
Political scientist Debora Halbert’s essay (Chapter 5) develops similar themes. Halbert
provides a critical examination of modern narratives of intellectual property piracy in the
international political arena. Focusing on US practices towards Asia-Pacific nations that are
deemed to have insufficient protection for the intellectual property products they import –
which is viewed as a major threat to US industries such as software, pharmaceuticals and
entertainment – Halbert shows how narratives of piracy have been employed strategically to
aid US intervention in the international exchange of intellectual goods. The piracy narratives,
she argues, were an important concomitant to US strategies to link intellectual property and
global trade issues beginning in the 1980s, which led to TRIPS. These narratives facilitated
and justified the expansion of intellectual boundaries that privilege intellectual property-rich
nations such as the USA and label as criminal nations that do not comply with increasingly
hegemonic US intellectual property principles. The rhetoric of piracy was necessary precisely
because the political and legal landscape had changed. The one who is properly labeled an
intellectual property pirate thus has significant consequences as the US struggles to impose
its notion of intellectual property rights (and wrongs) globally, including on nations with very
different historical and cultural traditions and where intellectual property concepts are weak
or even antithetical to US norms (Alford, 1995).
II

Globalization and the Politics of Intellectual Property

One of the most significant developments in the last decades of the twentieth century was the
emergence of a global intellectual property regime, which was primarily ushered into existence
by the 1995 TRIPS Agreement (see, for example, Yu, 2006). The social, economic, cultural,
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technological and legal reasons for this development have been fertile ground for intellectual
property scholarship (Bettig, 1996; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Drahos and Braithwaite,
2002; Halbert, 1999, 2005; May and Sell, 2006; Sell, 2003). Drahos and Braithwaite have
characterized TRIPS as a ‘quiet revolution’ in the way that intellectual property rights have been
defined, expanded and protected in the global economy – a revolution that primarily benefited
advanced nations and their powerful industrial lobbies and disadvantaged developing nations
that were persuaded (or coerced) into joining the agreement even though it increased the
costs of using intellectual property protected technology and information. The most dramatic
aspect of TRIPS was that it linked international trade agreements with intellectual property
by mandating that member states provide minimum levels of intellectual property protection
under their domestic laws, with only limited flexibility to enact laws that take into account
local economic and social considerations and needs (Correa, 2000, pp. 1–21). TRIPS also
provided powerful enforcement mechanisms to sanction non-complying nations. Each of the
essays in this section examines different aspects of how the exercise of intellectual property
rights in the international arena has expanded social and political control in the post-TRIPS
world.
Political scientist Susan Sell’s contribution (Chapter 6) examines the politics surrounding
the adoption of TRIPs in 1994 and the concomitant dramatic twentieth-century expansion of
a global system for protecting intellectual property. As Sell argues, TRIPs for the first time
linked requirements for strong intellectual property protection to multilateral international
trade issues. Countries that wanted – or needed – to benefit from the trade aspects of TRIPs
were required to shape their domestic intellectual property laws to conform with those of
the most developed nations to provide minimum levels of intellectual property protection.
Moreover, TRIPS itself also provided effective enforcement mechanisms to police compliance
with these TRIPS intellectual property mandates. As Sell shows in her essay, perhaps the
most remarkable aspect of the TRIPS story was how a small group of primarily US-based
strategic actors from intellectual property-intensive industries (including computer software,
entertainment and pharmaceutical industries) were able to influence the development and
adoption of TRIPs. Her work highlights the complex historical, cultural and political factors
that made TRIPs possible, including the power of legal norms to frame legal issues as
‘commonsensical’ and the role of private industry actors and governmental institutions, both
seeking change. Moreover, as Sell shows, the fuller story of TRIPS and the global politics
of intellectual property includes an analysis of how the aggressive enforcement of TRIPS
by developing countries against developed nations has generated a worldwide debate over
TRIPS and the political resistance to it. Many developing nations believe that TRIPS is
unduly coercive as well as overly solicitous of private corporate rights to the detriment of
human rights and developing nations’ interests. Sell argues that debates over such issues as
‘biopiracy’ or patenting of vital medicines such as AIDS/HIV drugs in developing countries
are a product of TRIPS and are emblematic of the difficulties intellectual property ‘haves’
will face in an increasingly contentious global debate over the proper scope of intellectual
property, particularly in those developing nations that believe TRIPS was foisted on them
without true negotiation.
Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite’s essay (Chapter 7) provides rich context to contemporary
debates over the global politics of intellectual property. Their essay is part of a larger body
of creative empirical research by these scholars that focuses on global business practices
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and regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002). The essay in
this volume demonstrates how, since the late nineteenth century, ‘global knowledge firms’
have marshalled economic, legal and cultural resources to control scientific and industrial
information to achieve marketplace dominance. By the early twentieth century, Drahos and
Braithwaite show, multinational corporations in a variety of industries in the USA and Europe
had developed large-scale research laboratories for the purpose of generating commercial
products. These research labs employed thousands of scientists to generate knowledge that
could be privatized and controlled for commercial gain. Over time, and with the help of an
emerging profession of patent agents and attorneys with sophisticated knowledge about how
to obtain and use intellectual property (whose professional goal has been to expand the scope
of intellectual property), these corporations were able to control industrial information to
achieve marketplace dominance. Well before TRIPS, Drahos and Braithwaite tell us, large
corporate actors had a long history of successfully using intellectual property law and systems
to control – indeed, cartelize – entire domains of knowledge. This ‘knowledge game’, they
argue, has been played for almost a century for the benefit of elite corporate actors to the
detriment of the public interest that the intellectual property laws are ultimately intended to
benefit.
Anthropologist Kristin Peterson’s essay (Chapter 8) examines private non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that address some of the inequalities that increasingly characterize
the globalization of intellectual property. She focuses on so-called ‘bioprospecting’ NGOs,
whose mission is to facilitate benefit-sharing by local indigenous communities in developing
nations.Their goal is to provide these local communities a share of the profits derived from the
commercialization of biological resources appropriated, and often patented, by international
pharmaceutical and botanical corporations. As Peterson and others have argued, this exploitation
of local resources has been abetted by the global expansion of intellectual property rights
under TRIPS. Peterson seeks to understand what effect the participation of bioprospecting
NGOs in developing nations as private intermediaries between local community interests
and the interests of international corporations has on the local communities these NGOs were
intended to benefit. Peterson examines briefly some of the reasons why bioprospecting NGOs
may not provide the benefits they promise. Moreover, she argues that a new form of private
governmental and policy-making authority represented by the NGO–industry combinations
she studied may also serve to limit public participation and debate over critical issues of
biodiversity and development. Peterson’s essay is not a fully developed ethnographic case
study, but it does suggest the powerful insights that intellectual property scholars can achieve
by utilizing such an approach and focusing on the operation of law as it is conceptualized,
negotiated and implemented in a complex web of social, political and power relationships in
the shadow of international intellectual property and trade laws.
Legal scholar Keith Aoki’s essay (Chapter 9) is an early and thoughtful article that frames
many of the legal and policy issues arising from the globalization of intellectual property law,
which many of the authors in this volume address. For Aoki, the increasingly global reach of
intellectual property law and the neo-liberal assumptions embedded in it raise three complex
and interrelated issues. The first is the skewed distributive effects that a post-TRIPS strong
intellectual property regime facilitates between ‘have’ and ‘have not’ nations. Aoki argues that
TRIPS permits intellectual property exporting nations to enforce their rights extraterritorially,
which erodes historic notions of territoriality and sovereignty, and disadvantages those
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developing nations which have very little local intellectual property to exploit and few
resources to pay for essential intellectual property-protected goods. Second, the increasing
global reach of intellectual property laws requires greater understanding about effective
strategies to protect a public domain that cannot be fully owned as intellectual property. Third,
Aoki highlights inequalities relating to the exploitation of intellectual property as a form of
‘biopiracy’ or ‘biocolonialism’, as developed nations are able to remove natural resources
and discoveries out of developing nations as ‘raw materials’ that can be manipulated and
transformed into intellectual property with no recognition or economic benefit (for example,
royalties) flowing back to the source nation. Aoki’s essay is a useful synthesis of emerging
issues relating to the globalization of intellectual property and an emerging political resistance
to it that a number of authors in this volume elaborate on in their own work.
Anita Chan’s essay (Chapter 10) is an insightful case study of a social movement to legislate
the mandatory use of ‘free’ – as opposed to proprietary, copyright protected – software for
all governmental computers in Peru. Chan examines the processes and dynamics surrounding
how free software proponents in Peru successfully transformed or ‘recoded’ the traditional
language of the global free software movement, which emanated from developed countries
and focused on the presumed technological and economic superiority of free software
technology, into a discourse that emphasized governmental relations and citizen rights. The
Peruvian free software movement, Chan shows, successfully linked the debate over choice of
software to broad issues of governmental reform, democratic participation and the politics of
international dominance and dependency.
III

Intellectual Property and the Public Domain

A central issue in intellectual property law is the proper balance between protecting
knowledge, innovation and creativity as private property versus disseminating it as free for
all to use. The tension between these two is captured in the concept of the ‘public domain’
or, sometimes, the ‘intellectual commons’, which scholars use to denote areas of social life
where public access trumps intellectual property rights. Somewhat surprisingly, intellectual
property scholarship on the public domain has been relatively sparse until recently (Lange
1981; Samuelson, 2006).10 Although scholars have not clearly or consistently defined such
terms as the ‘public domain’, there is a growing body of scholarship that critiques the overexpansion of intellectual property rights and the (often presumed) concomitant harmful
diminution of the public domain (see, for example, Boyle, 2003; Coombe, 1998; Demers,
2006; Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002).11 Many of these critics contend that expanded domestic
and international intellectual property protection threatens access to vital knowledge, free
speech and democratic participation. Drahos and Braithwaite (2002) summarize well some of
these concerns in their excellent empirical study of the globalization of intellectual property.
The redistribution of [intellectual] property rights involves a transfer of knowledge assets from the
For a very useful history of the public domain concept in US law, see Ochoa (2002).
As Samuelson (2006) points out there are many different conceptions of ‘public domain’,
essentially different public domains that concern scholars for different reasons. But I use the phrase ‘the’
public domain rather than ‘a’ public domain simply because that is the general convention.
10
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intellectual commons into private hands. These hands belong to media conglomerates and integrated
life sciences corporations rather than individual scientists and authors. The effect of this, we argue, is
to raise levels of private monopolistic power to dangerous global heights, at a time when states, which
have been weakened by the forces of globalization, have less capacity to protect their citizens from
the consequences of the exercise of this power (p. 2).

As Samuelson points out, there are multiple conceptions of the public domain that scholars
use to highlight different issues or policy concerns (Samuelson 2006). She identifies three
broad clusters of issues that intellectual property scholars of the public domain generally raise.
First are notions of the public domain concerned primarily with the legal status of information
resources. What can or should be the subject matter for intellectual property protection is a
question that falls within this category. A second notion of the public domain focuses on the
proper scope of the public’s right to use information resources even where these are protected
as intellectual property. The doctrine of ‘fair use’ of copyrighted materials is an example
that fits within this category. The third area Samuelson identifies from the literature pertains
to the accessibility of information resources themselves. This typology is helpful to frame
and compare the main voices, concerns and critiques involved in scholarship on the public
domain.
One criticism of public domain scholarship has focused on the uncritical acceptance or
‘romantic’ notion that it serves the ‘public good’ in all circumstances. Chander and Sunder
(2004), for instance, argue that the public domain concept may disadvantage certain indigenous
groups whose traditional information and culture generally will not qualify for protection
under Western models of intellectual property, which privilege individual authorship and
inventorship over collective creation or invention. Categorizing these groups’ information and
culture as part of the public domain, however, leaves them susceptible to lawful appropriation
by others – including corporate actors that may themselves be able to successfully claim
patent or copyright protections for unprotected genetic resources and traditional information.
Legal scholar James Boyle’s essay (Chapter 11) argues that recent decades of expansion
of intellectual property law constitute a ‘second enclosure movement’ directed towards the
intellectual commons. Comparing this movement to the ‘first’ enclosure movement in English
history, which was directed towards fencing-off the commons in land, Boyle questions
whether the ‘tragedy of the commons’ that scholars contend justifies propertization of land
applies with equal force to the intangibles that intellectual property law protects. Boyle also
examines whether concepts of the public domain are sufficiently theorized and robust to create
the proper balance in intellectual property between strong private property rights and the
public rights of access. A strong public domain is critical, Boyle argues, because intellectual
property rights may not serve the public good in the ways that intellectual property law
generally imagines, and may actually inhibit rather than promote the dissemination of critical
information.12 Boyle draws on the metaphor of environmentalism as a means of revitalizing
and theorizing the concept of the public domain – or, as he stresses, the multiplicity of public
Drahos and Braithwaite (2002) make a similar argument: that intellectual property law as it
actually operates as a system may actually harm competition and decrease the diffusion of knowledge
and creativity. Drahos (1992) applies this critique to basic scientific research as it is practised in
academia, and asks whether ‘intellectual property is a destroyer of some of the benefits that it is meant
to be promoting’ (p. 56).
12
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domains that are recognized in the scholarly literature – as a step towards rebalancing public
and private interests.13
Mark Rose’s essay (Chapter 12) examines the early history of English copyright law, where
the issue of authorial rights versus the public domain were expressly debated. He shows that
the emergence of copyright law gave rise to the concept of the public domain as a critical
element of civil society, but acknowledges that, from the beginning, claims for the public
domain were also weaker than the property claims for copyright. This finding fits well with
Boyle’s argument for the need to revitalize the public domain concept. Importantly, Rose also
demonstrates that the kind of closure that accompanied early copyright law (making literary
works private property) actually served to make literary works more accessible than they had
been when regulated under a system of publishing guild privileges.
Debora Halbert (Chapter 13), like Boyle, argues for the need to theorize the idea of the
public domain as a necessary counterbalance to the over-expansion of intellectual property
rights, particularly in copyright law. Halbert argues that the paradigm of private property that
legitimates intellectual property threatens the free flow of ideas that is essential to democracy.
Drawing on Habermas’s notion of the public sphere, Halbert argues for a linkage of that
concept with the concept of the public domain – a linkage she contends can clarify and
revitalize the public domain and thereby serve as a counterweight to expanding intellectual
property rights.
IV

Appropriating Indigenous Culture and Knowledge

There is a large and growing scholarly literature dealing with the possibilities and problems
associated with the ownership and control of the traditional knowledge and cultural products
of indigenous peoples around the globe, whether through the use of intellectual property
law or other legal regimes (See, for example, Brown, 2003; Coombe, 2001, 2005; Cottier
and Panizzon, 2005; Dutfield, 2005; Ghosh, 2003; Gibson, 2005; Greaves, 1994; Lange,
2005; Scafidi, 2005; Symposium, 2003). Traditional knowledge is a broad category that may
encompass, for instance, information concerning native seed varieties, traditional agricultural
practices, and botanical knowledge such as the medicinal properties of native plants (Ragavan
2001; Roht Arriaza, 1996). Traditional cultural products and practices may include music,
sacred images and symbols, or artwork (Downes, 2000; Long, 1998; Ragavan, 2001). The
central debate engaging intellectual property scholars concerns whether traditional knowledge
and culture can – or should – be subject to legal protection that allows for its exclusion from
the public domain. Some scholars argue that granting legal protection to traditional knowledge
and culture, either under intellectual property law or sui generis protection, is vital in order to
recognize and respect the heritage and values of often marginalized and vulnerable indigenous
peoples, as well as to promote biodiversity, sustainable development practices, sovereignty
and human rights (Coombe, 2001).
Perhaps the major issue in the traditional knowledge debate concerns the appropriation
of agricultural, biological and genetic resources of developing countries that may have
13
Coombe’s argument that intellectual property law is generative as well as prohibitive (1999)
suggests that a revitalized concept of the public domain may indeed shape social practices of both
intellectual property owners and the broader public.
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market value as pharmaceutical or other products in developed nations, which some scholars
and activists alike have decried as ‘biopiracy’ or ‘biocolonialism’. As these scholars have
demonstrated, increased globalization of intellectual property rights has facilitated mostly
Western corporate actors’ ability to acquire unprotected ‘raw’ natural resources from the
developing world and, with minimal modification, transform them into patentable ‘inventions’
(Greaves, 1994; Halbert, 2005: 135–63). Contemporary patent law, particularly in the United
States, promotes this development because it increasingly recognizes as patentable even
slightly modified agricultural or biological organisms and isolated or purified genetic materials
(Coombe 2005). These practices have been criticized as yet another example of North–South
global inequality and exploitation of resources, as developed countries of the North have
extracted tradition-based knowledge of the South to produce marketable products for the West
without sharing any of the benefits that this commodification of traditional knowledge has
produced (May and Sell, 2006: 194–9; Gervais, 2002; Ghosh, 2003).
The politics of the traditional knowledge debate are complex. As legal scholar Sabrina Safrin
argues, the increased propertization of biological and genetic materials that has occurred during
the past two decades has resulted in ‘hyperownership’ and threatens to create an anticommons
that diminishes access to raw genetic materials and the scientific information they provide.
This results, she argues, from the extension of patent law to protect previously unpatentable
biological and genetic resources, as well as from the subsequent reaction by many developing
nations to limit access to natural resources as a response to perceived exploitation. She argues
that hyperownership threatens to reduce innovation and, ironically, to threaten the autonomy
and liberty of the very indigenous peoples whose communities are the source of much of the
world’s biological and genetic resources (Safrin, 2004).
The traditional knowledge debate is equally complex when discussing cultural rather
than bio-genetic property. Here, too, the key question is whether ownership of intangible
cultural products is desireable (or even possible) and, if so, who exactly should be able to
exercise such ownership and control. As many scholars acknowledge, intellectual property
law has little capacity to protect communally created cultural products or to protect against
unauthorized uses of traditional songs, dances, or sacred symbols (Brown, 2003; Coombe,
2003). Moreover, while legal recognition of indigenous communities’ rights to control their
cultural productions might bolster these communities’ heritage and dignity, the enforcement
of such rights may also diminish the global cultural commons and threaten norms such as free
speech vital to democratic societies (Brown, 2003).14
Anthropologist Michael F. Brown (Chapter 14) critically assesses claims made in the
traditional knowledge and culture debates, which he also explores in greater depth in his
book on this same subject (Brown, 2003). In his essay, Brown argues against an over-reliance
on intellectual property law to protect indigenous cultural production and knowledge. He
offers a sceptical assessment of various movements to expand intellectual property concepts,
particularly copyright law, to protect indigenous culture. Based on case studies of actual
disputes over indigenous culture, Brown argues for a pragmatic and nuanced approach to
protection, one that relies more on negotiation, mutual respect and joint stewardship of
14
Rosemary Coombe (2003) critiques the concerns of some scholars, such as Brown, that
recognizing intellectual property rights in indigenous cultural products will have a deleterious effect on
the public domain or cultural commons.
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cultural information than on expansive intellectual property law, which Brown contends hurts
both indigenous peoples and undermines core pluralist democratic and civic values. Brown’s
essay thus presents a challenge to intellectual property scholars to clarify and specify the
potential for protecting indigenous knowledge and culture in light of the complicated social
and political context in which indigenous cultures around the world find themselves.
Anthropologist Shane Greene (Chapter 15) develops some of these same themes. Greene’s
essay is an insightful case study of one bioprospecting project that took place in the Peruvian
Amazon in the 1990s. This project aimed to foster traditional knowledge and support the
stewardship of local biological resources by including local indigenous Aguaruna communities
as collaborators in plans to collect and analyse plants that had potential medicinal value.
The project was a unique collaboration of pharmaceutical corporations, universities, NGOs
and indigenous groups. However, as Greene explains, this collaborative effort was largely
unsuccessful. The difficulties stemmed in part from the politics of the local indigenous
communities themselves and included the core issue of who properly represented these
communities; the lack of clear communication about the goals and expectations of the benefit
sharing project; asymmetries of power between international and local actors; and the often
contradictory motivations (and sometimes downright naivety) of each of the participants
involved in the project. His study is thus a detailed and suggestive analysis of the challenges
posed by efforts to propertize and market biological and genetic information of indigenous
communities as well as the serious limitations of intellectual property law as the means for
doing so.
Bita Amani and Rosemary Coombe (Chapter 16) focus on the controversial Human
Genome Diversity Project, a research effort proposed in the 1990s to include anthropologists,
geneticists, linguists and doctors in the task of mapping the human genetic variation of people
throughout the globe. The project was envisioned as a means to collect a valuable scientific
database for human genetic materials. It was, however, targeted primarily at collecting
genetic information from indigenous peoples. The scientific rationale for this focus was that
these indigenous groups’ relative historic isolation made their distinct genetic traits highly
prized by researchers. As Amani and Coombe demonstrate, the Project very quickly became
controversial as indigenous groups mobilized to protest the project’s racial and political
implications. Ultimately, the Human Genome Diversity Project was never funded, in large
part due to the political opposition it generated among indigenous communities who were its
main research targets. Amani and Coombe creatively use this example to explore the broader
dimensions of issues relating to the patenting of human genetic materials – what they term a
‘tide of genetic commodification’ – which the authors argue is a natural result of such genetic
research in contemporary society. Their essay explores the domestic and international politics
underlying this development, including the general absence of political opposition to it (or
even understanding of it), which Amani and Coombe link to the hegemony of the neo-liberal
ideology underlying intellectual property systems. Amani and Coombe also argue for the need
to fully understand and debate the moral and human rights implications of the worldwide
movement to commodify human genetic materials, which they suggest pose serious questions
such as how this patented genetic material will be used, how patents on human genetics
will affect health-care costs or insurance, and whether such patents can facilitate genetic
discrimination. This is a powerful and insightful essay that successfully links the struggles
of indigenous peoples to more generalizable moral and human rights issues concerning the
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patenting of human genetic materials – issues that these authors correctly identify as critical
political choices that are too important to leave unexamined. As this essay suggests, a human
rights discourse is a potentially powerful framework to de-naturalize ideologies of intellectual
property and shift debates over expanding intellectual property rights into broader discussions
of the ethical and moral implications of intellectual property.
V

Resisting Intellectual Property

The theme of ‘resisting’ intellectual property resonates in a number of the contributions
throughout this volume and is also a prominent topic of concern among intellectual property
scholars. Scholars generally agree that intellectual property rights play an increasingly
important role in modern knowledge-based economies and that these rights have expanded
both in duration and in scope of protection (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002; Halbert, 2005;
May and Sell, 2006). One criticism common to much of this literature is that overly-expansive
intellectual property rights upset the proper balance between private and public rights
and thereby hinder free speech, cultural expression and a rich public domain. Expanding
intellectual property also threatens the very creativity and innovation that intellectual
property laws are presumed to promote (Drahos, 1992, 1996; Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002;
Vaidhyanathan, 2001). A related criticism is that the ideology of property rights has obscured
the public purpose of intellectual property as well as the historical roots of intellectual property
as limited monopoly privileges, not rights (Bracha, 2004; Drahos, 1996). As a number of
scholars contend, resistance to expanding intellectual property rights is (and should be, most
add) a reaction to the increasing power of intellectual property rights in contemporary society
(Drahos, 1992, 1996; Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002; Halbert, 1999, 2005; May, 2000; May
and Sell, 2006).
Each of the essays for this section focuses on different meanings of ‘resistance’ to intellectual
property. Legal scholar Rosemary Coombe has been one of the most creative and prolific
law and society scholars developing this topic. Her essay (Chapter 17) focuses on the rights
of publicity asserted by celebrities. Drawing on postmodern legal theory and interpreting
multiple secondary sources, Coombe examines how marginalized subcultural groups resist
celebrity rights as a form of intellectual property by subverting, refashioning and using them
to negotiate meaning in everyday life. These groups, Coombe argues, which include gay male
‘camp’ cultures of the 1950s and 1960s, as well as contemporary lesbian and middle-class
female ‘Trekkie fanzine’ subcultures, redeploy the commodified celebrity image to construct
new social meanings and self-identities. This is an insightful example of a theme that Coombe
develops at greater length focusing on different types of intellectual property (1998): that
intellectual property is both prohibitive, as a right of legal exclusion, as well as generative, as
it may serve as a communicative cultural resource that consumers invest with multiplex and
multivocal social meaning.
Coombe and Andrew Herman develop this point further in Chapter 20. Their essay examines
the cultural practices of consumers in online digital environments. Such environments,
they argue, are powerful tools for disseminating and policing the meanings of intellectual
property, especially trademarks and copyrights. But the technology of the Internet also allows
consumers greater power to manipulate these ‘commodity signs of mass culture’. Coombe
and Herman review examples of resistance to intellectual property in the digital realm, such as
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Internet sites that collect and mock ‘cease and desist’ letters sent to police unauthorized uses
of trademarks or copyrights online, and ‘gripe’ or parody online sites that use trademarks and
copyrights to comment upon and criticize their presumed meanings and authorized messages.
Thus, while the exercise of intellectual property rights may be a form of social and cultural
control, the digital environment of the Internet empowers consumer resistance, disruption
and transformation of the ‘monologic’ of intellectual property by creating alternative, even
subversive, meanings for these symbols. This is a potentially rich area of research for law
and society scholars, since we know very little about how, why and to what effect intellectual
property owners assert their rights in everyday enforcement practices (Gallagher, 2005) or
about the nature of resistance to these enforcement practices.
Legal scholar Severine Dusollier’s essay (Chapter 19) is a thoughtful exploration of resistance
to strong copyright protection reflected in the ‘copyleft’ and ‘open source’ social movements.
These movements are an attempt by creators of software, music and art to voluntarily (usually
by contract or licence) remove or limit copyright restrictions on created works and thereby
permit a new form of authorship grounded in creative accretion and collaboration. She
explores how this new form of authorial practice does not ultimately undermine copyright,
even if it rejects its strong version of the romantic individual author.
Cultural historian Siva Vaidhyanathan explores yet another site for resistance to intellectual
property. He argues forcefully that current trends in copyright law inhibit creativity and the
free flow of information necessary for democratic dialog (2001). Focusing on case studies of
the evolution of US copyright law, Vaidhyanathan shows how expansive copyright protection
has undermined doctrines, such as fair use or the idea/expression dichotomy, that are intended
to foster public use of copyrighted works.
In Chapter 18, Vaidhyanathan turns his attention to technology as well as doctrine. He
examines ‘electronic cultural policy’, a series of attempts by copyright content industries
to mandate standards for electronic devices that display or distribute copyrighted materials.
These standards are designed to protect electronic copyrighted works, but they also have the
capacity to enhance the control of access to cultural products. As Vaidhyanathan shows, the
control of technology in this context affects access to intellectual property and, he argues,
threatens to extend copyright protection beyond the ‘thin’ limits that copyright has historically
permitted. Industry attempts at technological control, however, have been ineffective, and
have spurred widespread resistance by hackers and unauthorized ‘pirate’ digital downloaders
and file sharers. One result, Vaidhyanathan tells us, is that legitimate creative appropriation of
copyrighted works has become more difficult, while ‘underground or anonymous’ appropriation
has proliferated. Vaidhyanathan’s essay thus develops an important link between intellectual
property and technology as forms of social control.
Conclusion
The ubiquity and importance of intellectual property law and the policy issues it raises in
contemporary life are hard to exaggerate. Scholars such as those represented in this volume
have employed methodologies and focuses that underlie the law and society tradition in order
to understand intellectual property, including examining ‘law in action’ rather than simply
‘law in books’, and drawing on insights about law, society and culture provided by multiple
disciplines, such as history, sociology, anthropology, political science and the humanities.

xxviii

Intellectual Property

As the contributions to this volume demonstrate, a law and society approach to intellectual
property can illuminate much and it can suggest fruitful research questions, methodologies
and theories for understanding this important area of law and social life. To date, relatively
few academics who self-identify as ‘law and society’ scholars study intellectual property.
There is a dearth of scholarship, for instance, on intellectual property topics that have long
been a mainstay of law and society research, such as studies of intellectual property lawyers,
of administrative agencies or inter-governmental organizations that deal with intellectual
property, of the disputing process in intellectual property claims (both in and outside of courts),
or of individual attitudes, understandings and practices concerning intellectual property law.
This is changing. And, as the essays in this volume suggest, intellectual property promises to
be a rich subject matter for much future law and society research.
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